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STUDENT NoTEs
if the trespass is committed with the intention of killing or doing the
owner of the property great bodily harm, if he resists the trespass, in
such case the trespass is committed with felonious intention against
the owner, and he has the right to stand his ground and kill the
felonious trespasser if he has reasonable ground to believe that it is
necessary to protect his life or to prevent great bodily harm at the
hands of the trespasser." Baker v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 305, 306
(1892).
The defenses applicable to the defense of property are not applic-
able as a defense to a homicide as a result of a controversy over land.
The rights bf the parties in such a controversy are subjects which
should be litigated in the courts of civil jurisdiction. The guilt or in-
nocence of the defendant, upon the criminal charge, does not depend
upon whether he was right or wrong in the controversy relative to the
land. Neither party can, by a breach of the peace, legally vindicate
his rights whatever he conceives them to be, much less by going to
the extreme of taking a human life. Neither party will be allowed to
resort to the use of firearms or kill, except in the-usual manner of self-
defense. Utterback v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 723 (1899), Common-
wealth v. Bullock, 24 K. L. R. 78, 67 S. W 992 (1902).
To what extent may a person protect his property in an indirect
manner, such as the setting of springguns, traps, etc.? The general
rule appears to be that a person may not do indirectly, the things that
he may not do directly. A man would not be justified in defending his
property by the use of instruments of destruction, where he would
not be justified in taking life if his house or property was actually
assailed by a person with a felonious intent. Wharton, Crim. Law,
See. 570. Gray v. Combs, 7 J. 3. Mar. 479 (1832).
C. F PACE.
DIVOaCE-PowER oF TEE CouRT OF APPEALS To REVERSE JUDGMENT
OF DivoncE.-In the recent case of Autry v. Autry, 237 Ky. 608, 36 S. W
(2d) 15 (1931), the-husband sued his wife for divorce on the ground
that she had been guilty of such lewd and lascivious conduct as proved
her to be unchaste. The wife denied the allegation of the petition, and
counterclaimed for divorce on several grounds, including cruel and in-
human treatment. The chancellor granted the husband a divorce, and
the wife appealed. The court held that, "although we are without power
to reverse a judgment of divorce, yet we may consider the evidence for
the purpose of determining whether alimony was properly demed or the
custody of children was properly granted."
The prevailing rule in Kentucky, and in some other jurisdictions,
Is that no appeal lies from a judgment or order granting a divorce.
Chaudet v. Ohaudet, 231 Ky. 477, 21 S. W. (2d) 812 (1929).
In this country there is no tribunal having the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts. When the colonies and the states of the union
adopted the common law of England they did not adopt the ecclesias-
tical law pertaining to marriage and divorce. Aokerman v. Ackerman,
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200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192 (1910), Cotter v. Cotter, 225 F 471, 139 C. C.
A. 453 (1915).
At common law the ecclesiastical court had exclusive jurisdiction
of divorce. The chancery court did not assume either original or con-
current jurisdiction in divorce cases. In the absence of constitutional
provision or express legislation, no American tribunal has jurisdiction
to grant divorce. Crugom v. (rugonm, 64 Wis. 253, 25 N. W 5 (1885).
The jurisdiction to grant divorce is generally conferred by provisions of
the constitution prohibiting legislative divorces and conferring such
jurisdiction upon equity courts, and also by codes and statutes fing
the causes for divorce and prescribing rules of procedure. The forms
of the statute vary, but generally the jurisdiction is conferred in express
terms and is not to be inferred from the general jurisdiction in all civil
cases. Herron v. Herron, 16 Ind. 129 (1861), Ewing v. Ewing, 24 Ind.
468 (1865), Heatherwick v. Heatherunck, 32 Ill. 73 (1863). Our courts
have jurisdiction to grant divorces only when such jurisdiction has
been expressly conferred on them by statute. Judson v. Judson, 171
Mich. 185, 137 N. W 103 (1912). But such courts may grant alimony
without divorce, the equity jurisdiction being exercised to prevent
multiplicity of suits and because the law affords no adequate remedy
by which the wife can recover such support. Galland v. Galland, 38
Cal. 265 (1869), Glover v. Glover, 16 Ala. 440 (1849), Butler v. Butler,
4 Litt. (Ky.) 201 (1823). In exercising the jurisdiction conferred by
statute, the courts are largely governed by the rules of the English
ecclesiastical courts, except insofar as that law has been modified by
statute. Crump v. Morgan, 38 N. C. 91, 98, 40 Am. Dec. 447 (1843).
Although a suit for divorce is not a suit in equity, and therefore not
within the ordinary jurisdiction of a chancery court. Emerson v.
Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913), yet, except as the procedure
may be governed by statute, the courts will -apply the rules and prin-
ciples of equity. Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178, 106 N. E. 595 (1914).
In a majority of the jurisdictions it is the rule that an appeal lies
from a final decree of divorce. In Arkansas, Indiana, and Washington
an appeal lies by reason of a constitutional or statutory provision allow-
ing appeals from final judgments. In California, Iowa, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, and West Virginia, a divorce proceeding is con-
sidered as a suit in chancery and an appeal from a final decree is
allowed under the constitutional or statutory provisions governing ap-
peals in chancery. In Kansas, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, an appeal
from a final decree of divorce is expressly authorized by a constitu-
tional or statutory provision, while in Illinois, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania, an appeal is allowed from a final decree without ques-
tion. On the other hand, in the federal courts, and in Kentucky, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, Ohio, and Rhode Island, appeals are not allowed
from a final decree of divorce.
The rule that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has no jurisdiction
to review or reverse a decree of divorce, was originally laid down in
a statute enacted in 1816 which provided that "no writ of error shall
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be brought or sued out from any court of equity hereafter obtained,
granting a divorce from the marriage contract" Thornberry v. Thorn-
berry, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 251 (1823), Maguzre v. Maguire. 7 Dana (Ky.) 181
(1838), Pence v. Pence, 6 B. Monroe (Ky.) 496 (1846). Perhaps the
reason for the enactment of 1816 was the inconvenience that might re-
sult from annulling a valid divorce upon a writ of error which might
be prosecuted after one of the divorced parties had contracted another
marriage; but that reason does not apply to a void divorce, which could
never legalize a subsequent marriage of either of the parties.
Kentucky Statutes, Section 950-1, provides " but no appeal
shall be taken to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from a
judgment for the recovery of nor to reverse a judgment grant-
ing a divorce " This statute expressly forbids the Court of
Appeals to reverse a judgment granting a divorce, although it may
review the judgment in a divorce case in other respects. Shehan v.
Shehan, 152 Ky. 191, 153 S. W 243 (1913). According to the prevailing
Kentucky view, it is not only the right, but the duty of the court to
review the evidence where the mind is left in doubt on issues of fact
involving alimony, or the custody and maintenance of children. Evans
v. Evans, 229 Ky. 20, 16 S. W (2d) 485 (1929), or to determine
whether the property rights of the parties have been properly ad-
justed. Pleasnick v. Pleasnck, 215 Ky. 281, 284 S. W 1070 (1926).
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-NEGLIGENCE OF AN ATTORNEY IN PREPARA-
TION OF A WuLL.-In the recent case of Schtrmer v. Nethercutt, 157
Wash. 172, 288 Pac, 265, decided in 1930, the plaintiff employed the de-
fendant attorney to draw a will for the grandmother of the plaintiff.
The will was duly prepared in accordance with the instructions given
by the grandmother. By the terms of the will plaintiff was a legatee
and was to receive one-half of the residue of her estate. The defend-
ant carelessly allowed plaintiff to witness the will thereby causing
plaintiff to lose his one-half residuary share of the estate. Held, that
since plaintiff was not permitted to take under the will he was entitled
to recover the value thereof from the person responsible for its loss
through his negligent breach of trust.
The word "attorney" is derived from the Latin word attornare
which means proxy or agent. And an attorney is essentially an agent
of and for his client, the general principles which control in matters
of agency also being applicable to attorneys. The special undertaking
of an attorney is to establish or protect the rights of his client, whether
relating to life, liberty, person, reputation or property. This neces-
sarily creates a relation of trust and confidence between them which
measures and defines the extent of the attorney's duty. The very fact
of employment is sufficient to raise between the parties a contractual
relation. Then, any controversy between them must be adjudicated
upon the basis of this contract, unless the wrong complained of is some
tortious act, actionable per se. That actions for malpractice against
an attorney are based on breach of contract has been generally recog-
